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OPINION 
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McKEE, Chief Judge 
 
 Shawn Lowe appeals the conviction for illegally 
possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), that resulted from his conditional guilty 
plea.  The only issue raised is whether the District Court erred 
in denying his suppression motion.  The matter comes before 
us after a different panel of this Court remanded Lowe’s 
challenge to the suppression ruling back to the District Court 
for fact-finding and resolution of the conflicting suppression 
hearing testimony.  See United States v. Lowe, 525 F. App’x 
167 (3d Cir. 2013) (Lowe I).  On remand, neither party 
supplemented the record with additional evidence.  The 
District Court merely entered findings of fact and conclusions 
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of law and again denied Lowe’s motion to suppress.  This 
appeal followed.1   
 Lowe’s sole argument is that, because the police did 
not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop when 
they seized him, the evidence discovered as a result of the 
stop and corresponding frisk was obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment and should have been suppressed.  We 
agree.  We now hold that the District Court erred in 
identifying the moment of seizure, and that the officers did 
not have reasonable suspicion when they actually seized 
Lowe.  Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s 
denial of Lowe’s suppression motion. 
 
I. 
 
 “We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to 
suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings 
and we exercise plenary review over questions of law.”  
United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Our review of the District Court’s determination of the 
moment of seizure under the Fourth Amendment, as well as 
whether a seizure is supported by reasonable suspicion, is de 
novo.  See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 
(1996); Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 
2003).  A district court’s factual “finding is clearly erroneous 
when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.  Accordingly, 
‘[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in 
light of the record viewed in its entirety,’ we will not reverse 
it even if, as the trier of fact, we would have weighed the 
evidence differently.”  United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 
276–77 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted) (alteration 
in original).  
 
II. 
 
 In Lowe I, we were presented with conflicting versions 
of the facts necessary to determine the moment of seizure.  
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction over this timely appeal from a 
final decision of a district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Accordingly, as noted above, we remanded “to enable the 
District Court to make specific written findings of fact and 
conclusions of law.”  525 F. App’x at 168.  In his concurring 
opinion, Judge Ambro highlighted the gaps in the fact-finding 
that the District Court needed to address on remand.  He 
explained that if Lowe “may have stepped backward initially 
on the order to stop walking, this did not undermine his 
submitting to that order.”  Id. at 170 (Ambro, J., concurring) 
(citing United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 
2010).  In Judge Ambro’s view, “to any extent Lowe merely 
‘looked like he was getting ready to run’ per officer 
testimony” but did not actually run, he still would have 
submitted, and if Lowe “effectively halted at the officers’ 
behest,” he “was seized at the outset of the encounter.”  Id.  
Thus, in Lowe I the panel concluded “vacate[d] and 
remand[ed] the matter to enable the District Court to make 
specific written findings of fact.”  Id. at 168.  On remand, the 
District Court issued conclusions of law and factual findings 
that described the encounter more fully. 
 
A. 
 
 On September 19, 2010, at approximately 4:00 a.m., 
Philadelphia police officers McGinnis and Campbell received 
a radio call reporting “flash information of a black male 
wearing a gray hoodie with a gun in his waistband talking to a 
female that was at . . . 914 North Markoe Street outside.”  
United States v. Lowe, Crim. No. 11-111, 2014 WL 99452, at 
*1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2014).  The tip was anonymous.  The 900 
block of North Markoe Street is located in “a violent, high 
crime area known for drug crimes.”  Id.  Approximately 90 
minutes before receiving the radio call, Officers Campbell 
and McGinnis had received a call regarding an alleged gun 
shot at the 900 block of 49th Street, which is “around the 
corner” from 914 North Markoe Street.  Id.  The officers 
testified that they knew that a shot had been fired at a house, 
but that no one had been shot and no suspect had been 
apprehended.  914 North Markoe Street was the home address 
of Tamika Witherspoon, who is Lowe’s close friend.  
  
 Officers McGinnis and Campbell were near 914 North 
Markoe Street when they received the radio call, and they 
immediately drove to the address.  They arrived within two 
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minutes of receiving the call.  The officers initially turned 
their police sirens and lights on, but they turned them off 
when they were about a block and a half away from the 
address.  The officers parked their police car roughly 50 to 60 
feet away from the house.  Within seconds, two additional 
police cars pulled in behind their car.  Officer Pezzeca was in 
one of the additional police cars.  Officers McGinnis and 
Campbell, followed shortly thereafter by Officer Pezzeca and 
another officer, got out of their cars and quickly moved 
towards Lowe.  As the officers approached the house, they 
saw Lowe speaking with Witherspoon in front of 914 North 
Markoe Street.  Lowe was wearing a gray hoodie; his hands 
were in the hoodie pockets and were not visible to the 
officers.  However, the officers did not see a gun or anything 
indicating that Lowe had a gun, nor did they see or hear any 
argument or disturbance when they pulled up to the residence.  
There was a construction fence on the sidewalk preventing 
access to the north of Witherspoon’s house. 
 
 The District Court recounted the “varying versions” 
provided by the officers of what happened next.  Id. at 2.  
Officer McGinnis testified that, as he and Officer Campbell 
approached Lowe, he asked Lowe to remove his hands from 
his pockets “five to ten times,” and Lowe instead “froze” and 
looked both ways over his shoulders.  Id. According to 
Officer McGinnis, only after he gave five to ten commands 
and drew his gun did Lowe take his hands out of his pockets 
and start to move towards the wall, at which point the officers 
pushed Lowe against the wall.  In contrast, Officer Campbell 
testified that Lowe did put up his hands in response to the 
command to stop and do so, and he testified that Lowe 
voluntarily placed his hands on the wall.  Officer Pezzeca 
testified that as Officers Campbell and McGinnis approached 
Lowe and told him “several” times to put his hands up, Lowe 
backed away from the officers and kept his hands in his 
pockets until Officers Campbell and McGinnis grabbed Lowe 
and placed him against the wall.  Id.  All of the officers 
agreed that the frisk took place by the wall and that, following 
a brief struggle that ensued when Lowe reached for his 
waistband during the frisk, a firearm was recovered.   
 
 This sequence of events unfolded quickly:  Officer 
McGinnis estimated that less than a minute elapsed between 
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the first command and when Lowe moved to the wall, and 
Officer Campbell indicated that the whole incident, from his 
arrival on the scene to the struggle with Lowe and the 
recovery of the firearm, took less than two minutes. 
 
 In its “Findings of Fact,” the District Court described 
these events as follows:  
 
[W]hen the officers first arrived on the scene, Mr. Lowe was 
standing in front of 914 North Markoe. As the officers 
steadily moved toward Mr. Lowe, he took several steps 
backing away from them. He was prevented from moving 
back more than a few steps by the construction fence next to 
914 North Markoe Street. [] The Court also finds that Officers 
McGinnis and Campbell gave Mr. Lowe multiple commands 
to raise his hands or take his hands out of his pockets while in 
close proximity to Mr. Lowe. Mr. Lowe did not initially 
comply. 
 
Lowe, 2014 WL 99452, at *3.  In reaching this conclusion, 
the District Court explained that it “afford[ed] more weight to 
the congruent testimony of Officers McGinnis and Pezzeca, 
whose accounts provide a consistent story, and slightly less 
weight to Officer Campbell’s recollection regarding Mr. 
Lowe’s compliance with the order to raise his hands.”  Id. 
 
 The District Court did not resolve some significant 
conflicts in the police officers’ testimony.  This includes 
conflicting testimony regarding whether Lowe put his hands 
on the wall voluntarily, or whether his hands were placed 
there by the officers.  The District Court also failed to resolve 
the discrepancies in the police officers’ testimony about the 
number of times they ordered Lowe to show his hands and 
their distance from him when they issued those orders.  
Though the District Court’s lack of precision fuels some of 
the appellate arguments, the Findings of Fact that the court 
did make are sufficient to allow us to determine the legality of 
Lowe’s seizure. 
 
B. 
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 The District Court reached the following conclusion of 
law regarding when the interaction became a stop for Fourth 
Amendment purposes:  
 
The encounter between the officers and Mr. Lowe did not 
become a Terry stop at the officers’ first command that Lowe 
remove his hands from his pockets; instead, “the interaction 
became a stop” when the officers repeated their commands, 
“ma[king] it clear that [the suspect] was not free to ignore 
[the officers] and would not be left alone until he complied.” 
Johnson v. Campbell, 332 F.3d 199, 206 (3d. Cir. 2003) 
(finding that stop occurred after officer’s second command to 
individual to roll down his car window). 
 
Lowe, 2014 WL 99452, at *5.  The District Court thus held 
that “Lowe was seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment at the point when the officers repeated their 
commands to him, and he responded by not fleeing.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the District Court found that Lowe’s failure to 
show his hands in response to the officers’ initial commands 
could be considered in the totality of the circumstances in 
evaluating reasonable suspicion.  The court found that the 
officers were aware of the following pieces of information at 
the moment of seizure:  
 
an anonymous tip that a male matching Mr. Lowe’s 
description was engaged in criminal activity, the fact that 914 
North Markoe Street was located in a high-crime 
neighborhood in which a shooting had occurred over an hour 
earlier, the late hour of the night, and the fact that, when Mr. 
Lowe was approached and asked to show his hands, he 
refused to remove his hands from his hoodie pockets.  
 
Id.  Based on its conclusion that these facts provided 
reasonable suspicion to conduct the search of Lowe that 
disclosed the firearm, the District Court denied Lowe’s 
motion to suppress.  
 
III. 
 
 The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Though law 
enforcement officers ordinarily must obtain a warrant based 
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on probable cause before conducting a seizure, in Terry v. 
Ohio the Supreme Court articulated an exception that allows 
law enforcement to conduct a brief investigatory stop in 
limited circumstances.  392 U.S. 1 (1968).  Under Terry and 
its progeny, “an officer may, consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the 
officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal 
activity is afoot.”  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 
(2000).  The reasonable suspicion that justifies the Terry stop 
of a suspect also justifies a subsequent protective frisk of that 
suspect, where officers have reason to believe that the suspect 
may pose a danger to the officers.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.  
 
  In assessing the legality of a Terry stop, we must first 
pinpoint the moment of the seizure and then determine 
“whether that seizure was justified by reasonable, articulable 
facts known to [the officer] as of that time that indicated that 
[the suspect] was engaged in criminal activity.”  Campbell, 
332 F.3d at 205.  “A seizure occurs when there is either (a) ‘a 
laying on of hands or application of physical force to restrain 
movement, even when it is ultimately unsuccessful,’ or (b) 
submission to ‘a show of authority.’”  Brown, 448 F.3d at 245 
(quoting California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991)).  
Where a seizure falls in the latter category, we determine if 
there has been a “show of authority” using an objective test: 
“whether the officer’s words and actions would have 
conveyed . . . to a reasonable person” that he was not free to 
leave.  Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628.2    
 
 Whether an individual has “submitted” to a show of 
authority depends on both the nature of the show of authority 
                                              
2 The Supreme Court has sometimes referenced this test in 
describing a “seizure,” particularly in the context of traffic 
stops.  See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 
(2007) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 
554 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.); see also Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991)).  However, Hodari D. 
makes clear that the “so-called Mendenhall test” pertains to 
the “show of authority” component of a seizure, and that it 
“states a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for 
seizure—or, more precisely, for seizure effected through a 
‘show of authority.’”  Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627–28.  
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as well as the suspect’s conduct at the moment the officer 
asserted his or her authority.  When a suspect flees after a 
show of authority, the moment of submission is often quite 
clear:  It is when the fleeing suspect stops, whether 
voluntarily or as a result of the application of physical force.  
See id. at 628–29.  But different factors must be considered 
when an individual is already stationary, or “when an 
individual’s submission to a show of governmental authority 
takes the form of passive acquiescence.”  Brendlin v. 
California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007).  Thus, while “a fleeing 
man is not seized until he is physically overpowered, . . . one 
sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not getting up to 
run away.”  Id. at 262.  In either case, a show of authority 
without actual submission is no more than an “attempted 
seizure,” and a suspect’s conduct in the interval between the 
show of authority and the submission can be considered in 
determining the reasonableness of the eventual seizure.  Id. at 
254 (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 n.2). 
    
 We therefore turn to the two questions presented in 
this case: (1) When did Lowe actually submit to the show of 
authority?, and (2) Did the facts known to the officers at that 
moment of seizure give rise to reasonable suspicion? 
 
A. 
 
 The District Court cited to Campbell, 332 F.3d at 206, 
in finding that the seizure occurred the instant that the officers 
repeated their commands to Lowe.  Lowe, 2014 WL 99452, at 
*5.  It concluded that Lowe “submitted” at that moment by 
“not fleeing.”  Id.  However, Campbell arose in a very 
different context and is therefore of little assistance to our 
inquiry.  There, a single officer made a hand gesture to an 
individual seated in a parked van indicating that the officer 
wanted that individual to roll down his window.  Campbell, 
332 F.3d at 203.  When the individual did not comply, the 
officer persisted in making the same request.  Id.  We found 
that, because an objective person in the individual’s situation 
would have felt free to decline the officer’s first gesture, the 
first request was not a show of authority for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.  Id. at 206.  Rather, we held that an 
objective person would only reasonably not have felt free to 
decline the interaction after the officer repeated his motion, 
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and we thus concluded that that the repetition of the motion 
was the “show of authority” component of the seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment.  Id.  Since the individual submitted 
immediately by remaining seated in the van, he was seized 
when the officer repeated his request.  Id.  That case does not, 
however, stand for a per se rule that an officer does not assert 
his or her authority for Fourth Amendment purposes until he 
or she repeats a command.  
 
 To the contrary, in determining whether there has been 
a show of authority, courts must examine all of the 
surrounding circumstances to determine whether a reasonable 
person would have felt free to decline the interaction with law 
enforcement.  See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255.  In Mendenhall, 
Justice Stewart identified such factors as “the threatening 
presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an 
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or 
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that 
compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.”  
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) 
(opinion of Stewart, J.).  Here, three marked police cars 
nearly simultaneously arrived at Ms. Witherspoon’s residence 
at 4 o’clock in the morning.  Four uniformed police officers 
immediately got out of their patrol cars and approached Lowe 
and Witherspoon, commanding them to show their hands.  
Although the District Court did not make explicit findings 
about the speed with which the officers approached Lowe, the 
record indicates that they arrived in a hurried manner and at 
least one drew his firearm at some point during the encounter.  
A reasonable person in Lowe’s position would not have felt 
free to decline this interaction, turn, and leave.   
 
 Indeed, the Government candidly conceded that the 
officers made a show of authority from the moment they first 
approached Lowe.3  See United States v. Waterman, 569 F.3d 
144, 144–46 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a show of authority 
occurred when two uniformed police officers approached a 
house and commanded that people on the porch show their 
                                              
3 At the oral argument in Lowe I, the Government made this 
concession during an exchange with the Court.  See Supp. 
App. 37 (“[A.U.S.A.]: We are not disputing that there was a 
show of authority, and I hope I’m clear on that.”). 
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hands); cf. United States v. Smith, 575 F.3d 308, 314 (3d Cir. 
2009) (holding that there was no show of authority when two 
officers repeatedly asked an individual “Where is your girl’s 
house?”, but where “the two officers were still in their car, 
neither officer displayed his weapon, there was no physical 
touching, and no indication as to the language or tone of the 
officer’s voice that might have signaled a clear show of 
authority”).   
 On this record, the officers’ approach constituted a 
show of authority, as a reasonable person in Lowe’s position 
would not have felt free to decline the interaction or leave.  
However, that does not end our inquiry.  We must also 
determine when Lowe submitted to that show of authority.  
Because the order of events is critical here, we must address 
the parties’ arguments regarding the District Court’s Findings 
of Fact before inquiring into when Lowe submitted. 
 
B. 
 
 When read chronologically, the findings indicate that 
Lowe stepped backwards “[a]s the officers steadily moved 
toward [him,]” and that the officers did not “g[i]ve Mr. Lowe 
multiple commands to raise his hands or take his hands out of 
his pockets” until they were “in close proximity.”  Lowe, 
2014 WL 99452, at *3; see also Westport Ins. Corp. v. Bayer, 
284 F.3d 489, 498 (3d Cir. 2002) (according plain meaning to 
the district court’s choice of language in affirming its 
“implicit” findings of fact).  These findings control because 
they are not clearly erroneous.  Rather, they are supported by 
the record.4  See United States v. Roberson, 90 F.3d 75, 77 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
                                              
4 Many of Government’s arguments depend on reading the 
District Court’s factual findings as ambiguous as to the order 
of events, and on adopting the Government’s version of the 
encounter.  However, the Government bears the burden at a 
suppression hearing where, as here, the search or seizure was 
conducted without a warrant.  See United States v. Johnson, 
63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995).  It must establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence when the seizure occurred and 
that it was then supported by reasonable suspicion.  See id.  
Here, not only did the Government initially fail to make a 
clear showing as to the sequence of events, but it also failed 
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 The Government’s central argument is that Lowe did 
not submit to the initial show of authority because he failed to 
show his hands in response to the officers’ commands.  As 
noted earlier, the Supreme Court has explained that “[an 
individual] sitting in a chair may submit to authority by not 
getting up to run away.”  Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 262.  The 
Government’s argument invites us to add “unless the police 
have instructed him to stand up” to the analysis.  Neither 
Supreme Court precedent nor the law of our Circuit supports 
such a qualification.  See id. (explaining that responding to a 
show of authority by staying put is a means of passively 
submitting to that authority); Campbell, 332 F.3d at 206 
(holding that the defendant submitted to a show of authority 
by remaining in place even though he declined the police 
officer’s initial request to roll down his window and refused 
to provide the officer with his identification). 
 
 Instead, failure to submit has been found where a 
suspect takes action that clearly indicates that he “does not 
yield” to the officers’ show of authority.  Hodari D., 499 U.S. 
at 626.  Action—not passivity—has been the touchstone of 
our analysis.  The most obvious example is when a suspect 
runs from the police.  See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121; Hodari 
D., 499 U.S. at 626; Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 
596–97 (1989).  However, headlong flight is not required if a 
suspect otherwise takes action to evade or threaten a police 
officer.  For example, in United States v. Waterman, we 
found no submission where a suspect responded to commands 
to show his hands by reaching to his waistband and retreating 
through a door behind him and out of the officers’ presence 
entirely.  569 F.3d at 145.  Other courts have found no 
submission when a suspect already in motion refuses to stop 
when approached by an officer, see United States v. Freeman, 
735 F.3d 92, 95–97 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a suspect 
who continued walking when approached by a police officer 
                                                                                                     
to supplement the record after we remanded in Lowe I for 
exactly this type of fact-finding.  We will not, under these 
circumstances, indulge in hypotheticals and interpret alleged 
ambiguity in the District Court’s findings in favor of the party 
with the burden of proof—the Government.  See United 
States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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did not submit until physically restrained by the officer); 
United States v. Johnson, 620 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 2010) 
(noting that, “for a person who is moving, to ‘yield’ most 
sensibly means to stop”), or when a suspect makes suspicious 
motions consistent with reaching for a weapon, see United 
States v. Johnson, 212 F.3d 1313, 1316–17 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(holding that a suspect did not submit to a show of authority 
when he made “continued furtive gestures” including 
“shoving down” motions that were “suggestive of hiding (or 
retrieving) a gun”).  
  
 Unlike the suspects in those cases, Lowe stayed put in 
front of Witherspoon’s house when the officers converged 
and shouted commands at him to show his hands.  At that 
point, the record does not reflect that he made any threatening 
gesture or moved his hands or arms in any way, much less 
that he reached for a weapon or otherwise acted to rebuff the 
officers’ authority.  Indeed, one responding officer described 
him as “frozen” and another testified that Lowe looked 
“shocked.”  When an officer effectuates a Terry stop, his or 
her “show of authority” is an implicit or explicit command 
that the person stop.  See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626 
(discussing how the word “seizure,” in “[t]he language of the 
Fourth Amendment,” necessarily implies an actual stop).  We 
thus reject the Government’s contention that, because Lowe 
did not comply with the officers’ order to show his hands, he 
failed to “submit” for Fourth Amendment purposes to the 
officers’ show of authority—which was, of course, an entirely 
different order.  Indeed, “[i]t would be an unnatural reading 
of the case law to hold that a defendant who is ordered to stop 
is not seized until he stops and complies with a subsequent 
order to raise his hands.”  Johnson, 620 F.3d at 691.  Rather, 
we hold that when a stationary suspect reacts to a show of 
authority by not fleeing, making no threatening movement or 
gesture, and remaining stationary, he has submitted under the 
Fourth Amendment and a seizure has been effectuated.   
 
 We also reject the Government’s argument that Lowe 
did not immediately submit to the show of authority because 
the District Court found that Lowe “took several steps 
backing away” as the officers approached.  Lowe, 2014 WL 
99452, at *3.  The Government analogizes those steps back to 
the fleeing suspect in Hodari D., arguing that since Lowe did 
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not remain in place, he had not yet submitted before refusing 
to raise his hands.  Therefore, the Government argues, his 
steps can be considered in the reasonable suspicion analysis.  
We decline to equate Lowe’s few backward steps upon seeing 
several uniformed officers rush toward him with headlong 
flight—particularly where the District Court’s findings are to 
the contrary.  The District Court expressly found that “Mr. 
Lowe submitted to the officers’ show of authority by not 
fleeing from them when the commands to take his hands out 
of his pockets were repeated.”  Lowe, 2014 WL 99452, at *5 
(emphasis added).5  Indeed, the District Court found Lowe’s 
steps so innocuous that it did not even identify them as a 
factor contributing to reasonable suspicion in its discussion of 
relevant facts known to the officers at the time of seizure.  See 
id.  Therefore, we agree with the determination, implicit in 
the District Court’s findings, that a few startled steps back in 
the face of onrushing, armed police officers is entirely 
consistent with a surprised reaction and even acquiescence.6  
Without Lowe ever having turned around in an attempt to 
walk, much less run, these few steps backward hardly could 
transform his limited movement in response to the onrushing 
officers into flight.  See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626.   
 
                                              
5 As noted, the District Court erred by finding that the 
officers’ show of authority did not occur until they repeated 
their commands.  However, the finding that Lowe did not flee 
remains instructive as to how the District Court viewed 
Lowe’s steps backwards as the officers approached.  It did not 
characterize them as flight. 
 
6 While the Government would have us interpret the District 
Court’s statement that Lowe “was prevented from moving 
back more than a few steps by the construction fence” to 
mean that Lowe intended to flee or was attempting to flee, 
that argument disregards the District Court’s explicit finding 
that Lowe was “not fleeing” and is not supported by 
authority.  Courts have not considered a suspect’s subjective 
intent in this situation.  Indeed, “a person who has actually 
stopped in response to officers’ commands but who looks like 
he might run” still has submitted to an order to stop.  Johnson, 
620 F.3d at 692. 
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 In sum, we hold that Lowe submitted to the officers’ 
authority by staying put in front of 914 North Markoe Street.  
Neither his action, in taking a few steps backwards before 
stopping, nor his inaction, in keeping his hands immobile 
despite commands to move them, negated that submission.    
 
C. 
 
 Police may only seize a person consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment if they have reasonable, articulable, and 
individualized suspicion that a suspect is engaged in criminal 
activity.  See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123; Terry, 392 U.S. 1.  
Here, the facts known to the officers when they first 
approached Lowe included “an anonymous tip that a male 
matching Mr. Lowe’s description was [in possession of a 
gun], the fact that 914 North Markoe Street was located in a 
high-crime neighborhood in which a shooting had occurred 
over an hour earlier, [and] the late hour of the night.”  Lowe, 
2014 WL 99452, at *5.  The Government conceded in its 
Appellee Brief and at oral argument in Lowe I, as it must, that 
these facts alone did not give rise to reasonable suspicion to 
stop Lowe.  Gov. Br. 19; Supp. App. 46–47; see Florida v. 
J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270–72 (2000); Roberson, 90 F.3d at 80; 
cf. United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 357 (3d. Cir 
2000) (“[W]e conclude that the officers had reasonable 
suspicion after they received the face-to-face tip, were in a 
high-crime area at 1:00 a.m., and saw Valentine and his two 
companions walk away as soon as they noticed the police 
car.”).   
 
 The officers made a show of authority to which Lowe 
submitted as they approached.  No additional facts developed 
before the stop would have supported a reasonable suspicion 
that Lowe was engaged in criminal activity.  Thus, contrary to 
the Government’s arguments, we have no occasion to 
consider Lowe’s failure to comply with the order to show his 
hands, as that noncompliance happened after the moment of 
seizure.  Additionally, we need not resolve whether Lowe’s 
steps backwards were taken a moment before or after the 
seizure, as even if Lowe had stepped back before he was 
seized, that extra fact in these circumstances would not have 
given the officers reasonable suspicion.  See Lowe, 2014 WL 
99452, at *3.  As explained above, we concur with the 
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District Court that the steps were not suspicious and were 
more suggestive of simple surprise than criminality.  
Moreover, both the tip and its level of corroboration here are 
very similar to the circumstances in Florida v. J.L.7  The J.L. 
Court not only held that the officers did not have reasonable 
suspicion for the stop, it emphasized that it was not even a 
“close case.”  Id. at 271.   
 
 As we have stated, our reasonable suspicion analysis 
must be limited to the facts known to the officers when they 
effected a Terry stop.  Thus, because we conclude that Lowe 
was seized when the officers approached him and he stayed 
put outside Witherspoon’s house, the Government lacked 
reasonable suspicion at the moment of seizure.   
 
IV. 
 
 We realize that it is in the interest of public safety and 
the safety of police for officers to be able to ascertain whether 
people are armed, and that one of the most efficient ways to 
do this is for officers to stop and frisk individuals who have 
                                              
7 In J.L., police received a tip that a “young black male 
standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt was 
carrying a gun[,]” and they subsequently stopped, frisked, and 
recovered a gun from a man at that bus stop who met the 
description.  529 U.S. at 268.  Even considering the 
neighborhood and hour of the night, the officers had less 
reason to be suspicious when they approached than in a case 
the Court has called “borderline.”  Id. at 271 (referring to 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990), where police 
received a tip that a woman would carry cocaine as she left a 
specific apartment, entered a specific car, and drove to a 
specific hotel, and where officers conducted surveillance and 
confirmed that the tipster had accurately predicted the 
woman’s movements).  Almost none of the aspects of a tip 
that indicate reliability are present here, see Brown, 448 F.3d 
at 249–50 (3d Cir. 2006), and the contents of the tip 
corroborated by the officers at the scene were the basic 
descriptions of Lowe’s location and appearance.  See J.L., 
529 U.S. at 272 (“[A] tip [must] be reliable in its assertion of 
illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate 
person.”).   
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aroused suspicion.  However, the Fourth Amendment limits 
law enforcement’s power to seize individuals to situations 
where their suspicion of criminal activity is specific, 
individualized, and reasonable.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.  
Officers proceeding on the basis of an anonymous tip that 
does not itself give rise to reasonable suspicion have many 
tools at their disposal to gather additional evidence that could 
satisfy the requirements of Terry and therefore allow police to 
stop the individual under appropriate circumstances.  See 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“Some tips, 
completely lacking in indicia of reliability, . . . require further 
investigation before a forcible stop of a suspect would be 
authorized.”).  These include investigation, surveillance, and 
even approaching the suspect without a show of authority to 
pose questions and to make observations about the suspect’s 
conduct and demeanor.  See White, 496 U.S. at 331 
(describing how officers conducted surveillance to 
corroborate details in a tip and developed reasonable 
suspicion); Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (explaining that 
conversations between individuals and law enforcement 
officers do not necessarily implicate the Fourth Amendment).  
Officers’ observations during such an inquiry or investigation 
could create reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct a 
Terry stop.  However, reasonable suspicion is always 
evaluated as of the moment of seizure, and we cannot 
consider facts that develop after that moment.  See Campbell, 
332 F.3d at 205.   
 
 Because this record does not establish that the police 
had reasonable suspicion to justify stopping Lowe, the 
evidence recovered as a result of the ensuing search is the 
“fruit of the poisonous tree” and must be suppressed.  See 
Brown, 448 F.3d at 244 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 
371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)).  
 
